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16. ORLAN Revisited: Disembodied 
Virtual Hybrid Beauty
peg zeglin br a nd
If you are squeamish
Don’t prod the
beach rubble
—Sappho, fragment 84
Between 1990 and 1993, the artist ORLAN offered nine surgical perfor-
mances of Carnal Art in a series entitled The Reincarnation of St. ORLAN.
In “Bound to Beauty: An Interview with ORLAN,” I sought to explain the 
complexities of these performances, as well as those of her series of large-
scale photographs, begun in 1998, called Self-Hybridizations.1 In the 
Reincarnation series, ORLAN’s actual body underwent multiple surgeries 
that permanently altered her physical self, turning it into an imagined self 
inspired by the forehead of the Mona Lisa plus the eyes, chin, and mouth 
of other women painted by well-known male artists throughout history, each 
with his own particular ideal of female beauty.2 In that essay, I suggested a 
workable concept of virtual beauty that defined beauty as “being in essence 
or effect, not in fact; not actual, but equivalent, so far as effect is concerned. 
Virtual beauty substitutes for, yet is not in fact, real beauty.”3 In a later publi-
cation, I further expanded upon the concept of virtual beauty by citing con-
ditions for its uniqueness and difference from real beauty.4 However, unlike 
some recent critics who call themselves ORLAN admirers, I did not call 
ORLAN’s performances hideous or her beauty monstrous. In fact, I cited her 
own report of how people react to her in public: that they might think she
looks monstrous, although she does not feel that way. I remarked that “one 
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could even say that there is beauty in her eyes, evidence that only some of 
her features have been changed to contrast with today’s standards of beauty.”5
I still hold to that description, in spite of the time that has passed since the 
1998 interview, and I now marvel that so many contemporary interpreters 
of her work have cast her as monstrous. My initial reaction is that this read-
ing reduces her to an artworld beauty-basher who sounds more like a seller 
of shallow shock than a serious artist of feminist intent.6 Even if ORLAN’s 
goal is to create a substitute for female beauty or to subvert ideals of physical 
beauty per se, does she warrant the descriptor “monstrous”? Human blood 
and sutures may indeed be distasteful, abject, or even disgusting, but surely 
the artist’s intent is more complex than what is seen on the surface. Viewers 
who are squeamish are well advised to step back and refrain from prodding 
the metaphorical beach rubble of ORLAN’s postoperative detritus. But for 
those of us who cannot help but look—like snatching a glimpse of a horrible 
car wreck—I offer a more nuanced analysis to give ORLAN her due.
Consider ORLAN’s later work Self-Hybridizations, which carries her 
exploration of virtual beauty to new levels and engages in less theatrical-
ity involving blood and bandages. In describing how ORLAN was “bound 
to beauty” with this work, i.e., tied to imitating features of ancient Olmec 
and Mayan sculpture by means of digitally altered self-portraits—I suggested 
that these were her most successful realizations of virtual beauty. Unlike 
the Reincarnation series, which utilized a surgeon’s scalpel, these on-screen 
images are the result of digitized, manipulated data. As self-portraits, they 
are imaginative and art-historically inventive. Moreover, they represent the 
disembodied ORLAN, based as they are on a computerized composite of 
features. They have elicited some unexpected criticisms, however, being 
described as “comical and grotesque,” “potentially racist,” like “a minstrel’s 
use of blackface,” and “carnivalesque, somewhat extraterrestrial, and gen-
erally misinterpreted.” Cast as “caricatures” and as images of “the offspring 
of the carnival freak and the humanoid,” they have been critiqued as being 
more about “costume” and digital technology than the physical process of 
“looking into the opened body,” i.e., the actual body of ORLAN under the 
knife (as in the Reincarnation series).7 Because of this, some judge them 
inferior to her earlier surgeries.
But they are also about a much broader context of standards of beauty, 
international in scope, whereas the localized physical changes to ORLAN’s 
own body were based on a masculinist version of European art history. The 
pre-Columbian images, for instance, incorporate both female and male 
standards of beauty. ORLAN extracts herself from the narrow confines of 
308
PEG ZEGLIN BRAND 
European art history, transporting us back to reexamine an incised stone 
mask from 900 bce and a stucco head of Lord Pacal from a seventh-century 
bce tomb. The autonomy of the artist is essential to a healthy sense of iden-
tity across cultures; what follows in her work is an evident sense of empow-
erment and control. Self-Hybridizations is additionally about self-control.
Under her own power, ORLAN creates extraordinarily colorful selves. To 
call her work “potentially racist” or similar to “a minstrel’s use of blackface” 
seems to misconstrue her intentions and to limit her artistic freedom through 
the censorship of a distorted form of political correctness. (Such a charge 
also demonstrates a lack of knowledge that African Americans themselves 
applied blackface, increasing the complexity of meaning of their actions . . . 
and hers.)8 Are current interpreters becoming too (in)sensitive? too PC? too 
dismissive of the artist’s intent, preferring their own misreadings instead? 
Moreover, is the aesthetic value of her work lost in these readings?
I argued in 2000 that ORLAN may have moved away from the 
Reincarnation performances toward Self-Hybridizations because she thought 
that in the latter she would be more transparently obvious in meaning and 
less frequently misunderstood. I may have overstated the ability of audi-
ences to comprehend, however. I will argue in this essay that the virtual 
beauty that ORLAN unfolds in her ongoing series Self-Hybridizations is not 
a real or actual beauty but rather a fake beauty, causally disembodied, based 
on the effects she intends to create from an imaginative use of combined 
hybrid imagery. Subverting the familiar philosophical notions of aesthetic 
distance and aesthetic appreciation,9 hers is not a monstrous beauty unless 
one redefines the concept “beauty” and couples it with “monstrous” in fairly 
unprecedented ways. And yet fake beauty still has aesthetic features, ones 
not routinely discussed in assessing ORLAN’s work. Finally, in my attempt 
to problematize the tendency of current critics to interpret her works as mon-
strous, I suggest the possibility of generational differences in understandings 
of the term “feminist,” shifts in meaning from early feminist theory of the 
1970s to ever-evolving, twenty-first-century notions of the term, all of which 
add to the confusion. As I negotiate this terrain, I hope to steer both crit-
ics and viewers more directly to the words of the artist herself, who seems 
to plead for clearer understanding and appreciation when she laments, “I 
have tried to make my Self-Hybridations as ‘human’ as possible, like mutant 
beings, but I still did not think that the confusion could be possible.”10
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Entre Deux (1997)
First, a brief word about the precursor to Self-Hybridizations: a series 
which dates from 1997 and is entitled Entre Deux or Between the Two. These 
photos are all about ORLAN: a series of eighty-two self-portraits arranged in 
two horizontal rows, like a diptych, with forty-one digitally altered images 
of changes to her face on the bottom row based on the five male inspira-
tions of her actual surgeries in the Reincarnation series, as described by 
Kathy Davis.
She devised a computer-synthesized ideal self-portrait based on features 
taken from women in famous works of art: the forehead of Da Vinci’s Mona
Lisa, the chin of Botticelli’s Venus, the nose of Fountainebleau’s Diana,
the eyes of Gérard’s Psyche and the mouth of Boucher’s Europa. She did 
not choose her models for their beauty, but rather for the stories which are 
associated with them. Mona Lisa represents transsexuality for beneath the 
woman is—as we now know—the hidden self-portrait of the artist Leonardo 
Da Vinci; Diana is the aggressive adventuress; Europa gazes with anticipa-
tion at an uncertain future on another continent; Psyche incorporates love 
and spiritual hunger; and Venus represents fertility and creativity.11
Her visage is already “morphed with this source material,” as Peggy Phelan 
notes, “creating a photographic hybrid, a half-’natural’ and half-constructed 
image of her face, thus exposing the ways in which the natural is inflected 
by the constructed and vice versa.”12 The top row consists of forty-one photo-
graphs of her face, taken on successive days of her healing from the 1993 sur-
gery entitled Omnipresence (with each photograph’s date and time noted). A 
textual banner reading “Between the Two” connects the two rows. ORLAN 
referred to the top row as produced by a “machine-body” (i.e., her own face) 
and the bottom row as produced by “the machine-computer.”13
The lower row presents computer-generated blurred images of her 
face, with her mouth in muted shades of blue, green, peach, and red on 
each print. In Between the Two, no. 15 (1994), she morphs into Botticelli’s 
renowned fifteenth-century Birth of Venus, complete with wind-blown hair, 
as if Zephyros were just off-camera (fig. 16.1).14 In others, her lips are heav-
ily outlined with dark red, revealing the bloody aftereffects of the surgery. In 
most she looks calm; in some she looks anguished, with her face twisted and 
lips askew. Looking saintly, suffering, and stoic—like a goddess in the mak-
ing—she subtly alludes to Western European ideals of beauty. These images 
are about ORLAN dealing with what is inside her head prior to launch, 
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before she goes global. She is located between two realms of identity, her 
former and her future selves: entre deux. She is shadowy; contemplating; a 
chrysalis waiting to open. The repetitive shots of her face, like Andy Warhol’s 
stacking of the image of Marilyn Monroe, show her mulling over her self, her 
identity: an inner churning with, as yet, no discernible direction. Once we 
see the work that follows, Self-Hybridizations, we can, in retrospect, discern 
a sense of deliberation: her self-obsessed introspection is about to expand to 
worldwide scope. She is about to project her self into the entire history of 
art, across different cultures, over thousands of years and various continents, 
becoming—herself—the virtual traveler through the interconnected contin-
uum of civilization. The pensive positioning of her head (tilted, like Venus’s) 
and the anticipatory demeanor of her gaze off camera do not prepare us for 
this explosion of intent, the breaking down of barriers, the breakthrough of 
subtlety into a deluge of color and form.
Figure 16.1. ORLAN, Between the Two, no. 15,
1994. Color photograph in light box, 120 × 160 
cm. © ORLAN.
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It is important to highlight that strict visual copying or imitation of 
the original artworks’ formal properties is not the artist’s intent here; recall 
ORLAN’s own words:
I do not want to resemble Botticelli’s Venus.
I do not want to resemble the Europa of Gustave Moreau—who is not my 
favorite painter. I chose the Europa of this painter because she figures in an 
unfinished painting, just like so many of his paintings!
I do not want to resemble Gérard’s Psyche.
I don’t want to resemble Diana of the Fontainebleau School.
I don’t want to resemble Mona Lisa, although this continues to be said in 
certain newspapers and on television programs despite what I have said on 
numerous occasions!15
This explanation allows us to understand the error of many of the claims 
made about ORLAN, namely, that she is trying to replicate the physical ide-
als of female beauty; that she fails; and that (whether intentionally or not) 
she becomes monstrous. She borrows visual motifs, but she is more inter-
ested in the characteristics of these women than the way that male artists 
portrayed them. She appropriates, but not to replicate. This fact is often lost 
on viewers. Thus, hers is not an imitative art form; rather, she is concerned 
with what I would describe as inner beauty: the aggression of an adventur-
ess, the courage of facing an uncertain future, love and spiritual hunger, fer-
tility and creativity. These are qualities derived from the stories or narratives 
of goddesses, not their visages; they are not visible, but rather lie below the 
surface. (After all, goddesses are mythical and fictional, i.e., nonreal beings, 
at their outset.)
In 1997, Davis (who has subsequently written extensively on the topic 
of cosmetic surgery) sought to distinguish ORLAN’s surgeries for the sake of 
art from typical cosmetic surgery utilized by women for the sake of enhance-
ment or beauty:
Although she draws upon mythical beauties for inspiration, she does not 
want to resemble them. Nor is she particularly concerned with being beau-
tiful. Her operations have left her considerably less beautiful than she was 
before. . . . While ORLAN’s face is an ideal one, it deviates radically from the 
masculinist ideal of feminine perfection. Her ideal is radically nonconform-
ist. It does not make us aware of what we lack. When we look at ORLAN, 
we are reminded that we can use our imagination to become the persons we 
want to be.16
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In assessing Reincarnations in 1997, Davis offers the clue to the first works of 
Hybridizations—ORLAN’S ongoing series that is all about imagination and 
becoming something one is not, something imaginary, something unreal, 
fictional, and disembodied:
ORLAN’s project explores the problem of identity. Who she is, is in constant 
flux or, as she puts it, “by wanting to become another, I become myself.” “I 
am a bulldozer: dominant and aggressive . . . but if that becomes fixed it is 
a handicap. . . . I, therefore, renew myself by becoming timid and tender.”17
In other words, one can undermine and change one’s identity in a variety of 
ways. From 1987 (the year of the first Reincarnation surgery, on ORLAN’s 
fortieth birthday) to 1997, ORLAN used her own body (“My body is my 
art”). From 1997 on, the alterations are digital; she moves beyond scal-
pels and blood, unleashed upon multiple traditions of visual representation 
within the entire history of art. Davis adds,
Her identity project is radical precisely because she is willing to alter her 
body surgically in order to experiment with different identities. What hap-
pens to the notion of “race,” she wonders, if I shed my white skin for a black 
one? Similarly, she rejects gender as a fixed category when she claims: “I am 
a woman-to-woman transsexual act.” . . . ORLAN’s art can be viewed as a 
contribution to postmodern feminist theory on identity. Her face resembles 
Haraway’s (1991) cyborg—half-human, half-machine—which implodes the 
notion of the natural body. Her project represents the postmodern celebra-
tion of identity as fragmented, multiple and—above all—fluctuating.18
Disembodied identity becomes, overwhelmingly, the modus operandi that 
transitions ORLAN from surgical alterations to her visual exploration of pix-
els printed on paper. She moves from the real to the virtual, and her appro-
priations of beauty, within her self-described “self-portrait,” become virtual 
as well:
At the inception of this performance, I constructed my self-portrait by mixing 
and hybridizing, with the help of a computer, representations of goddesses of 
Greek mythology—chosen not because of the canons of beauty that they are 
supposed to represent (seen from afar), but for their histories.19
Histories are chosen and illustrated but not, strictly speaking, imitated. 
ORLAN is up to much more here: I suggest that what she is up to is the 
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creation of virtual beauty. Consider the conditions I placed upon “real” ver-
sus “virtual” in 2001:
X is an instance of real beauty in artworks for perceiver P at time t if and only 
if P recognizes and appreciates with (disinterested) pleasure the perfection, 
or uniformity amidst variety, or smoothness, or smallness, or uniqueness, or 
symmetry, etc., in X.
Y is an instance of virtual beauty created by artist A for perceiver P at 
time t if and only if P recognizes and appreciates with (disinterested) plea-
sure that
(i) Y is created by A by means of reconfiguring digital information in 
cyberspace;
(ii) the figures and objects represented in Y are disembodied;
(iii) the digital information reconfigured in Y may be reconfigured by P; and
(iv) Y is not an instance of real beauty.20
ORLAN has subsequently elaborated on the distinction by blurring the 
boundaries:
The aim is not to confront what is real with what is virtual—and vice versa—
in a sort of endless Manichean and reductive opposition. On the contrary, 
virtuality mingles with reality as its imaginary part and the reality which I cre-
ate is not devoid of virtuality. . . .
All figurative works can be said to be “virtual.” The representation of the 
Virgin and Child by Jean Fouquet [ca. 1450], for instance, is the portrait of 
Agnès Sorel. Still we do not see Charles VII’s mistress, but a painting.
. . . The virtual and the real elements, when they are used at the same 
time, become new ways of obliquely questioning art itself and the world 
around us.21
Like numerous artists before her, ORLAN seeks to create and under-
stand a multiplicity of selves through both her own likeness and invented 
faces; like many women uncomfortable with their own bodies, Davis 
claims, she first used plastic surgery as “a path towards self-determination—
a way for women to regain control over their bodies.”22 As a digital artist, she 
moves beyond the mere physical. As a feminist, she combines the two goals 
in order to become empowered: in control. As Davis notes, “ORLAN has to 
be the creator, not just the creation; the one who decides and not the pas-
sive object of another’s decisions.”23 Entre Deux is just the beginning. There 
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are no limits to the identities ORLAN can imagine. Freed from her body, 
her new identities are disembodied and hybrid: unreal and virtual. Entre 
Deux lies between the two bodies of work: the earlier Reincarnations and 
the later series of Self-Hybridizations to come.
Self-Hybridizations Pre-Columbian (1998–2000) 
Just one visit to ORLAN’s website (http://www.orlan.net) immediately 
immerses a viewer in a dizzying array of work: clicking, one moves forward 
and backward, in and out of time. Gone are the days when to see such works 
one needed to travel to a museum or gallery, pick up an exhibition catalogue 
from the library, or purchase an art magazine for glossy reproductions. It’s all 
there on your screen, in living color, bursting with vim and vigor: an instant 
look at art produced in a studio outside of Paris by a woman whose concep-
tual reach far exceeds her geographical grasp.
In 1998 ORLAN commented on the scope and intent of Self-
Hybridizations: “My new work is a global survey of standards of beauty in 
other civilizations and at different periods in history. I start with the pre-
Columbian civilizations and will eventually study Africa and Asia.” Like 
many other artworks currently celebrated in international artworld envi-
rons as explorations of cultural, multicultural, and cross-cultural identities, 
this series was intended to pursue a “range of multiple, evolving, mutating 
identities” by means of a global travelogue.24 Having chosen the Olmec 
colossal heads (weighing five to twenty tons) found on the Gulf Coast of 
Mexico—male heads that signify respect and honor—she additionally uti-
lized smaller stone masks of rulers that flaunted the proportion and symme-
try of the formal incised patterns across the face. Both originals invoke the 
shamanic or godlike power of the male ruler that ORLAN dons in her self-
portraits as she recreates her self as a hybrid of cultures and a virtual beauty 
with underlying meaning and power: a reference to inner power and beauty. 
She explained her use of the visage of Lord Pacal similarly: “It wasn’t a reli-
gious thing; it was an aesthetic thing.”25 In this series she becomes obsessed 
with the physical ideals of beauty, performance, and royalty that operate 
within a culture totally outside the paradigm of the white European mid-
dle class. She engages in aesthetic play by engaging her imagination in the 
manipulation of what used to be and what could be, all constructed with-
out the interference of real bodies. Gone are the shadowy references to 
Botticelli as muse. ORLAN has projected herself back in time with her cre-
ativity under complete control; she manipulates her self and her face in 
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virtual sacrifice to the gods of beauty standards past. The updated version of 
her 1998 face, photographed by Gerard Rancinan in 2001 as Woman with 
Self- Hybridized Head, incorporates the same incised facial marks but is 
even more powerful, because her head is shown, disembodied, upon a plat-
ter.26 My previous essay explains how the incised lines on ORLAN’s face 
in her Refiguration, Pre-Columbian Self-Hybridization, no. 1 (1999) repli-
cate those on an Olmec mask made of white and gray jadeite, making her 
a hybrid that seeks to appropriate the shaman’s power to enter the supernat-
ural realm (fig. 16.2).27 As rephotographed in 2001, ORLAN literally high-
lights her disembodiment and dismemberment (her head without body); 
virtuality triumphs.
Figure 16.2. ORLAN, 
Refiguration, Pre-
Columbian Self-
Hybridization, no. 1,
1999. Digital photo-
graph, 100 × 150 cm. 
© ORLAN.
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In my 2001 attempt to expand (or “explode”) the aesthetics of “art” and 
“beauty” that help us understand such works, I compared ORLAN’s pho-
tographs to those of the Japanese artist Yasumasa Morimura, who photo-
graphed himself as various actresses, both American and Japanese. Whether 
dressing up as Vivien Leigh or Marilyn Monroe, Morimura took traditional 
analog photographs of his body; that is, he was never Morimura-as-Marilyn 
in the disembodied sense of computerized art. Like Cindy Sherman in many 
of her works, he merely dresses up and poses for the camera. In another 
series, however, he digitally pictured his face on the body of a nude and 
pregnant Mona Lisa (Mona Lisa in Pregnancy, 1998), and then replaced the 
belly of the nude Mona Lisa with an internal view of the fetus and organs, 
reminiscent of da Vinci’s sketchbook drawings of the fetus in utero (Mona
Lisa in the Third Place, 1998).28 These composite collages span centuries, 
combine and hybridize body parts (real and fictional), and create virtual 
beauty of its own sort: the beauty of a “person” who is not real, but only vir-
tual. When Morimura appropriated Sherman’s Untitled #96 (1981) by scan-
ning the original and reconfiguring it with a computer to produce To My 
Little Sister (For Cindy Sherman) (1998), he again created a disembodied 
hybrid fictional candidate for expanding or exploding the traditional cate-
gory of beauty into that of virtual. Interestingly, no critic has called either art-
ist’s work “monstrous.”
In addition to undermining any one philosophical definition of “beauty” 
that may provide comfort to those of us craving the ideals of Western civiliza-
tion that we so devotedly learned in art history and aesthetics classes, ORLAN 
seeks to create new hybrids that exercise the autonomy of the artist and the 
empowerment that viewers subsequently derive from the image. Her insis-
tent pushing of the boundaries of “multiple, evolving, mutating identities” is 
a playful but reverential romp; the process is more important than the prod-
uct, although the product becomes more vivid and intense as the series pro-
gresses. She does not set out to portray real beauty, to re-create real beauty, 
or to imitate it. Rather, as I have been arguing, hers is an intentionally false 
beauty: fake as can be, yet—and here is where her true genius lies—as seduc-
tive as the real thing. Virtual beauty is that of the disembodied object, the fic-
tional ORLAN-as-Mayan or ORLAN-as-Olmec. Why, then, does she elicit 
the more serious charge of monstrosity, even from her defenders?
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Self-Hybridizations African (2000–2003)
The next phase in Self-Hybridizations is a series of photos inspired by 
African natives, photographed as if being discovered for the first time in the 
nineteenth century by a probing explorer with a new camera (most are in 
black and white). Consider the image entitled Ancient Crest of Ejagham 
Nigeria Dance and Face of Euro-Saint-Etienne Woman (2000; fig. 16.3). 
Also included in the African series is a life-size sculpture of a human body 
(ORLAN’s) scarified in decorative patterns. As described by one sympathetic 
critic, Serge Gruzinski, the photographic images exemplify the “still rela-
tively little explored—and therefore relatively unfamiliar” phenomenon of 
mélange: “Mixing, mingling, blending, cross-breeding, combining, super-
imposing, juxtaposing, interposing, imbricating, fusing and merging are all 
terms associated with the mestizo process, swamping vague descriptions and 
fuzzy thinking in a profusion of terms.” Considered as a manifestation of 
Figure 16.3. ORLAN, Refiguration, African Self-
Hybridization series, Ancient Crest of Ejagham 
Nigeria Dance and Face of Euro-Saint-Etienne 
Woman, 2000. Digital photograph, 124 × 155.5 cm. 
© ORLAN.
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the fracturing of modern society, ORLAN becomes a forerunner of a trend 
whereby “standard frames of reference are being shattered by these surpris-
ing and sometimes awkward juxtapositions and presences.”29 Beauty is hardly 
subject only to subversion, as in the twentieth century. In the new millen-
nium, it is shattered, shocked, and shunted. Prompting more questions than 
they answer, these are the harbingers of a so-called postmodern, hypernarcis-
sistic, amortal, mutant world.30 But what, exactly, does this mean?
Consider ORLAN’s own words, written expressly for Elisabeth Azoulay 
and Françoise Gaillard’s five-volume collection 100,000 Years of Beauty:
Like sex and money, beauty follows the dictates of criteria of recognition, 
codes and laws in which the artist’s job is to divert so as to expose suprem-
acy. In an attempt to thwart the authoritarianism of the perceptions of beauty 
that prevail in our societies, I had two small lumps implanted on my temples. 
They are like two erupting volcanoes that threaten the predominant notions 
governing female beauty, which gives my work a subjective and political 
meaning.31
The artist’s feminist intentions are undeniable; she continues to challenge 
the patriarchal norms that have established the dictates of female beauty 
over the centuries, continuing into the present day of mass media saturation 
and consumer culture.32 She is, herself, the photographic print upon which 
the battle between actual and virtual body ensues.
I show that beauty is in no way a natural phenomenon but a cultural con-
struct. I also want to mark the fact that, in an age of globalization, the range 
of possibilities is simultaneously spreading and shrinking. In one sense, we 
are witnessing a proliferation of pluralistic expressions and theatrical orches-
trations; in another we are using Western criteria as a filter to all of this mul-
tiplicity and creativity, in the image of what Impressionism and Cubism in 
particular did for Oriental and African arts.
In addition to her feminist perspective, ORLAN adopts the Western lens by 
which most artworld aficionados view the world: us versus them; us versus 
other. Her goal is to expose the bias we bring to the perception of multiply-
ing “expressions” and “orchestrations” as she projects a utopian possibility 
that lies beyond the intensifying pressures of today:
I construct images of mutant beings whose presence may be envisaged in a 
future civilization not beholden to the same physical pressure as we are. It 
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might therefore accept their potential for beauty and sexual attractiveness. 
The Self-Hybridizations are created through the hybridization of my face, 
supposedly corresponding to current codes of beauty, along with works from 
other civilizations and other timescales that embody standards of beauty dif-
ferent from our own.
The beauty of her future, however, is a virtual beauty of hybrids and 
mutants. It has little connection with beauty as defined by the power bro-
kers of the multi-million-dollar “beauty industry” today. It is a false, nonreal, 
made-up beauty of the disembodied; it is a fakery of the original, a deliber-
ate offspring. Note ORLAN’s use of the phrase “supposedly corresponding to 
current codes of beauty.” Moreover, it is explicitly constructed, socially con-
structed by the artist, with no tie to a “real” beauty that is considered innate, 
inherited, or genetic. It is fiction, though based in fact and social standards. 
She concludes, while simultaneously projecting even further into the future 
with the introduction of bio-art:
My work has always been a struggle against all that is innate, inexorable, 
programmed, against nature and DNA. And also against all the pressure of 
prevailing ideologies, all bodily formatting procedures. One of my current 
projects involves the development of an installation called the Harlequin 
cloak from the culture of my own cells and those of different origins (animal 
and human). While the body is a language, it is above all a theatre for the 
staging of alternative, nomadic, mutant and shifting identities. A theatre of 
pleasure and humour that opens onto the infinite interplay of metamorpho-
sis, marking the global hybridization of beings and cultures.
As if to verify that virtual beauty is causally connected to the diffuse disem-
bodiment of the original physical body, but not an imitation of it, art critic 
M. Perniola offers the following:
Virtuality is not a simulation,
An imitation, a mimicry of reality,
But an entry into another dimension,
Ontologically different, as it were.33
Ontological difference is essential to understanding the ephemeral, meta-
physical selves of ORLAN disembodied. She hybridizes herself into multiple 
“copies,” but not imitations. Attempts to understand her work have not always 
carefully maintained this distinction. Operating in another dimension lifts 
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her from the physical, even the (traditionally) photographic, into another 
realm that is tricky to distinguish and even more difficult to discern. How, 
then, do we put into words her apparent imitation of, for instance, a nine-
teenth-century painting by George Catlin (plate 11)?
Self-Hybridizations American-Indian (2005–2007)
Numerous life-size photographic prints of ORLAN dressed in Native 
American garb with rich red backgrounds pulsate while her painted face 
changes, mutates, and explores. Consider one example, entitled Painting 
Portrait of Wash-Ka-Mon-Ya, Fast Dancer, a Warrior, with ORLAN’s 
Photographic Portrait, Refiguration, American-Indian Self-Hybridization, no. 
3 (2005) (plate 12). The theme of a 2010 group show in which she partici-
pated entitled “Islands Never Found” is vague and indeterminable, like the 
seeking of an elusive “place” or perhaps a frame of mind:
Leading, internationally renowned contemporary artists interpret their very 
own islands never found through a series of extraordinary works—some 
never before exhibited. Installations, videos, photographs, sculptures, draw-
ings and paintings take the visitor on a journey, where each island—a met-
aphor for life and constant exploration—raises questions and doubts about 
the very meaning of life.
The artists taking part in this project have embarked on a journey through 
uncharted waters, on a never-ending voyage, continually haunted by the pos-
sibility that the destination might in fact be a nonplace, a utopia, a simple 
territory of desire—and therefore beyond reach.34
ORLAN’s identity is ever evolving and can adapt to a new swatch of paint 
worn boldly on her face, an imposing bearclaw necklace hanging defiantly 
around her neck, or the feathers and beads that sprout from her head and 
ears. According to one description of these works, the large-scale series was 
created during ORLAN’s New York studio residency at the International 
Studio and Curatorial Program and was based on the paintings of George 
Catlin, who documented native tribes before the widespread use of photog-
raphy.35 The Indian is romanticized here, beautified perhaps, but ORLAN’s 
goal is not to make herself beautiful in the traditional sense, nor to approx-
imate the real beauty of an Indian that she, as a white European woman, 
can never attain. Hers is a false beauty, purely virtual, where virtuality is not 
a simulation, an imitation, a mimicry of reality, but an entry into another, 
ontologically different dimension.
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One way to interpret this distinction is to deem ORLAN’s virtual beauty 
without substance or interiority, as Jill O’Bryan notes: “The Self-Hybridation
photographs have no interior, no texture, no body.”36 Her claim is simi-
lar to an earlier observation by Arthur C. Danto about ORLAN’s previous 
Reincarnation series:
Hegel characterizes Romantic Art as responsive to the demand for making 
inwardness visible, of showing what a person is so far as that person is coinci-
dent with his or her feelings. And that would explain why The Spear-carrier
is bland: classical art, if Hegel is right, had no concept of inwardness. It 
explains as well why a contemporary artist, ORLAN, who submits herself to 
plastic surgery in order to make herself conform to aesthetic prototypes, in 
fact looks, well, creepy. She shows no inwardness.37
Can this description be extended to Self-Hybridizations as well? Is O’Bryan, 
following Danto, on to something here? One of ORLAN’s inspirations is 
Catlin’s painting White Cloud: Head Chief of the Iowas (1844–45), one 
of many he created to portray “paradigmatic ‘Indianness’”—images that 
became icons of the “wild” inhabitants of the western United States, as imag-
ined by the more “civilized” immigrants back east who were new to the land, 
fresh from Europe, or descended from newcomers to America.38 ORLAN’s 
vacuous look may digitally replicate the way that George Catlin sought to 
depict Native Americans, but for this reason it lacks the real thing, or, as 
Danto frames it, a “person coincident with her or her feelings.” She uses 
Catlin’s image to replicate the vacuity that Europeans and newly arrived 
“Americans” perceived in Indians. Her comment upon their colonialist 
superiority is not racist, but rather points out the narrowness of their encoun-
ters with people they condescendingly referred to as “savages.”
Consider the contrast between ORLAN’s disembodied, virtual, hybrid 
images, devoid of inwardness and interiority, and contemporary art by Native 
Americans. When Indians themselves satirize or parody images like Catlin’s 
paintings and Edward Curtis’s photographs, their works are considered rec-
lamations and subversive examples of commoditization.39 When ORLAN 
does so, according to some critics, the result is potentially racist and “mon-
strous.” Upon what interpretive strategy do such labels depend? It is time to 
dive into monstrous beauty.
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Mistaking Monstrous Beauty: ORLAN’s Virtual Beauty
Joanna Frueh originally defined “monster/beauty” in 2001 in a book 
of the same name, subtitled “Building the Body of Love,” locating the con-
cept of monster/beauty within an ideal, prescribed beauty—our current 
“standard of success,” i.e., cultural norms that extol purely visual beauty, 
equal to perfection, and its attendant sexual charisma that attracts lovers of 
beauty. In contrast, monster/beauty is self-care and self-development that 
comes from “aesthetic/erotic attentiveness, . . . self-consciousness, self-pride, 
self-pleasure, and self-love.” “Aesthetic/erotic wit, a decisive way of dressing 
oneself in the sensuality and beauty of Aphrodite, proceeds from the corpo-
real subjectivity and agency that define monster/beauty.” Moreover, it is not 
(merely) a visual beauty; Frueh emphasizes “the sensual dimensionality that 
is a human being’s beauty . . . the aesthetic/erotic field that people create for 
themselves and inhabit, the field that they in fact are. . . . Beauty as only and 
simply a visual feature—a still picture—is erotically devoid, a failure of love. 
. . . In contrast, and in eros, monster/beauty is the flawed and touchable, 
touching and smellable, vocal and mobile body.”40
Focusing on the agency of the woman whose body might traditionally be 
culturally seen as lacking, disappointing, or aging, monster/beauty embod-
ies the agency of action and not just her passive reception of the gaze of oth-
ers; it also includes discomfort with her physical body that is never perfect. 
Thus it offers the (still) taboo personal voice, i.e., the body that speaks (up for 
itself). It is “an aesthetic/erotic aptitude, fleshed out and inspirited with the 
essence of Aphrodite.”41 This aptitude is a form of sexual allure, and monster/
beauty is a “monster” only insofar as the woman embodies the allure of plea-
sure and satisfaction with(in) her own body, in spite of cultural norms, result-
ing in the true enjoyment of her own body and the authentic valuing of her 
beauty. As such, the “monster” learns to “build the body of love” whereby the 
aesthetic (the seen) and erotic (the sensed) are inseparable.42
Frueh is focused primarily on American culture and her role as a 
middle-aged woman within prescribed beauty norms not of her own cre-
ation. The monster who builds the body of love is engaged in the positive 
and constructive task of making herself more comfortable in her own skin, 
not in the negative and destructive critique of cultural norms or her own 
physicality. This so-called monster learns to accept her body while bypassing 
cosmetic surgery for the purpose of enhancement; self-empowerment comes 
from self-love and strength. In contrast, ORLAN challenges and undercuts 
the ideal beauty norms that exist to be challenged. Her work, Reincarnation
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or Self-Hybridizations, is not about love or the seeking of love or self-love. 
Thus Frueh’s concept of monster/beauty—as innovative and insightful as it 
is—offers little in the way of helpful interpretation of ORLAN’s performance 
art. In fact, Frueh offers explicit evidence that it is inadvisable to apply mon-
ster/beauty either to the documentations of ORLAN’s surgeries or to certain 
photos by Cindy Sherman, Jo Spence, and Hannah Wilke; she calls their 
work “the modern erotics of damage.” As an aberration from the socially 
accepted ideal of physical perfection, the monster/beauty of the bodybuilder, 
for instance, may be considered grotesque, abject, bizarre, incongruous, 
eccentric, strange, and ridiculous. For Frueh, it is separate from violence, 
disease, breakdown, mutilation, or the hospital. Hence it is not, Frueh adds, 
the “Sadeian or Battailean erotics of horror based in an aesthetics of disgust,” 
i.e., an erotics of damage, nor is it attached to the Western tradition of shame 
and transgressiveness outlined by Freud.43 Yet, as we will see shortly, Frueh’s 
concept of monster/beauty has been inappropriately applied to ORLAN’s 
work by at least three recent authors.
But first, let us look briefly at the comments of Tanya Augsberg, another 
feminist who, like Frueh, focuses on woman’s subjectivity and agency by cit-
ing the history of philosophy’s male-dominated construction of woman as 
an inferior, irrational being who is merely passive and inactive. Writing in 
1998, she suggests ORLAN’s surgical performances constitute an antidote to 
this tradition, calling them “performative transformations of feminist med-
ical subjectivity” which “cannot simply be reduced to extreme acts of self-
mutilation in the guise of art.”
ORLAN’s multimedia surgical theatre is meant to be transformative as well 
as risky; by undergoing a planned series of cosmetic surgeries, ORLAN is 
self-consciously exploring a means of identity transformation. . . . [She] 
undergoes a particular beauty ritual—cosmetic surgery—in order to expose 
and question those techniques of gender that simultaneously construct and 
discipline “beauty-conscious” female identity.44
Like Frueh, Augsberg highlights the proactive agency and subjectivity of 
ORLAN’s work, but refrains from calling it monstrous. Citing criticisms 
of her as “hysteric, a narcissist, a fetishist, a scalpel slave (or polysurgical 
addict), and even a sufferer of Body Dysmorphic Disorder,” she defends (but 
does not necessarily condone) her body art as an act of social resistance (one 
of many forms since 1990) that results in an uglification of self within our 
rapidly evolving age of technologized beauty.45
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Only when Augsberg is explaining ORLAN’s “complicity in, and depen-
dence on, these institutions [of medicine, science, and art] in order to stage 
the resistance she enacts”—what she calls ORLAN’s “Staging the Medical 
Subject”—does she invoke the concept of the “bloody, slimy, ghastly, yet 
also celebratory carnivalesque scene reminiscent of Gargantua’s birth in the 
writings of Rabelais.” But she takes this characterization of the carnivalesque 
(professed by ORLAN herself, as mentioned earlier) no further; rather, she 
highlights the uniquely created subject of ORLAN who orchestrates the live 
surgical scene, in which she is awake and gazes back at the camera filming her:
ORLAN may allow her body to be cut, stretched, and resculpted, but her 
persistent gaze signals not only her resistance to becoming the completely 
docile body that medicine requires but also her insistence on being recog-
nized at all times as more than just a body. Her art demands of her audience 
that we witness her self-awareness not only of her surgery but of us look-
ing at her. In other words, ORLAN not only returns the viewer’s gaze, but 
expects—if not demands—that her recognition of us be in turn recognized 
by each individual.46
Augsberg is comfortable calling ORLAN’s exposure of her body’s liv-
ing tissues mesmerizing and revolting. Moreover, she interprets ORLAN’s 
challenge to us as one of “highlighting the body’s grotesque abjection in 
surgery and in recovery” without reducing it to “visceral performance.” “To 
put it bluntly, ORLAN’s art does a lot more than just gross all of us out: 
she provokes us to become more self-reflexive in our roles as spectators.”47
Augsberg’s cogent analysis of ORLAN as a medical subject who creates 
and controls a self-conscious subjectivity in her performances neither sug-
gests nor lends credence to the charge of monstrosity, perversion, or men-
tal imbalance. There seems no reason to presume that “grotesque abjection” 
is equivalent to or implies monstrosity. Moreover, sometimes ORLAN is 
playful and perversely provocative, as in Kiss on Tracing Paper, The Fourth 
Surgery-Performance Titled Successful Operation (1991), a photograph in the 
Reincarnation of Saint ORLAN or Picture New Pictures series (fig. 16.4). Yet 
at multiple points, Augsberg cites the tendency for viewers and critics to mis-
interpret ORLAN and to cast her as mad and irrational. This analysis pres-
ents a stark contrast to the critics who follow—writing in 2005, 2007, and 
2009 respectively—who mistake ORLAN’s intent or misconstrue her mean-
ing. Question: What has happened to such criticism in the twenty-first cen-
tury? ORLAN, it appears, becomes monstrous.
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Three significant critics currently invoke either Joanna Frueh’s mon-
ster/beauty or Sigmund Freud’s theory of the terrifying castrated woman as 
their inspiration for misinterpreting ORLAN as monstrous.
First, C. Jill O’Bryan (2005), already cited earlier, does not directly ref-
erence Frueh’s concept of monster/beauty in her Carnal Art: ORLAN’s 
Refacing, although she includes a chapter entitled “Beauty/The Monstrous 
Feminine.”48 Rather, in this chapter, O’Bryan calls ORLAN’s work “the 
monstrous feminine” in an attempt to locate ORLAN within the binary tradi-
tion of beauty and the monstrous, personified by the gorgon Medusa. When 
Medusa’s beauty “prompts” Neptune to rape her in the temple of Minerva, 
Minerva’s revenge for this transgression turns her into a snake-haired mon-
ster who, in turn, transforms—into stone—all who gaze upon her. According 
to Ovid’s Metamorphosis, her serpent-hair frightens evil-doers.49 This myth 
prompted both Freud and Jacques Lacan to link Medusa’s head to male fear 
of castration; to quote Freud,
To decapitate = to castrate. The terror of Medusa is thus a terror of castra-
tion that is linked to the sight of something. Numerous analyses have made 
Figure 16.4. ORLAN, The Reincarnation of Saint ORLAN 
or Pictures New Pictures series, Kiss on Tracing Paper, The 
Fourth Surgery-Performance Titled Successful Operation,
1991. Photograph, 165 × 110 cm. © ORLAN.
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us familiar with the occasion of this: it occurs when a boy who has hith-
erto been unwilling to believe the threat of castration, catches a sight of the 
female genitals, probably those of an adult, surrounded by hair, and essen-
tially those of his mother.
Lacan describes Medusa’s head as
this something, which properly speaking is unnamable, the back of this 
throat, the complex, unlocatable form, which also makes it into the prim-
itive object par excellence, the abyss of the feminine organ from which all 
life emerges, this gulf of the mouth, in which everything is swallowed up.50
O’Bryan utilizes these descriptions of “an anxiety of sexual difference that 
traverses the centuries” to analyze a 1978 performance piece by ORLAN 
entitled Documentary Study: The Head of Medusa in which she allowed 
viewers to view her sex through a large magnifying glass while simultane-
ously showing the heads of persons arriving, viewing, and leaving on video 
monitors. Exiting visitors were handed a copy of Freud’s text on Medusa, 
including the words “At the sight of the vulva even the devil runs away. “51
I have no quarrel with O’Bryan’s contention that ORLAN is exploiting the 
“monstrousness” of her sex in this early performance work, but when she 
extends the accusation of monstrousness to the skin lifted from ORLAN’s 
face in her surgery in Omnipresence, she holds that viewers (like the devil) 
will similarly run away from such monstrousness, leading her to conclude 
that “like those who gazed upon Medusa, we respond to ORLAN’s mon-
strousness.” Our gaze upon ORLAN’s flayed face, or, as she calls it, her ani-
mal nonface, directly refers to the gaze that alternatively turns the body to 
stone, the gaze that instills fear in the male who sees the castrated female. 
O’Bryan realizes the need to explain how ORLAN’s subsequent work, how-
ever, transcends this binary entrapment in the monstrous; she points out 
that “the myth of Medusa and Freud’s analysis exhibit a male understand-
ing of female genitalia that culminates in horror—the monstrous femi-
nine” and that ORLAN’s subsequent work “points toward overcoming the 
male economy of viewing described by Freud, to the degree that ORLAN’s 
images begin to redirect the relationship of the female body to language and 
to representation.”52
Along those lines, in a later chapter of Carnal Art, O’Bryan extends the 
explanation of the digital images of Self-Hybridizations by mentioning an 
occasion in 1999 when she presented the work of ORLAN to a group of 
feminist art historians who strongly objected, denouncing ORLAN’s future 
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humanoid hybrids—her fantasy aliens and fictional beings—with “accusa-
tions of ORLAN’s overwhelming pretence and racism,” likening them to “a 
minstrel’s use of blackface,” and saying that they exhibited “a carnivalesque 
otherness that serves to exacerbate the gap between the normative and the 
grotesque (the self and the other).” Apart from the art historians’ reactions, 
O’Bryan herself believed that ORLAN’s images were “comical and gro-
tesque,” and appeared “carnivalesque, somewhat extraterrestrial, and gener-
ally misinterpreted.” But she succumbs to calling ORLAN’s faces “offspring 
of the carnival freak and the humanoid” and critiques them as being more 
“about digital technology or, at best, costume” than the physical process of 
our “looking into the opened body,” i.e., the actual body of ORLAN under 
the knife (in the Reincarnation series).53 These are the images O’Bryan pre-
viously described as having no interior, no texture, no body, compared to the 
images of ORLAN’s actual surgeries.
When O’Bryan moves on to discuss ORLAN’s Self-Hybridizations,
she initially defends ORLAN’s use of both the carnivalesque and the gro-
tesque but equates the female grotesque with going beyond sexualization, 
an odd sense of the term indeed; she even calls some of ORLAN’s images 
“really quite sexy.”54 (It is important to note here that ORLAN herself sug-
gests that different styles were used in her operations, ranging from the 
carnivalesque and the parodic to the grotesque and the ironic, and since 
Self-Hybridizations is a continuation of the Reincarnation series, these styles 
persist.)55 O’Bryan’s deeper analysis of ORLAN’s mutating and mutant pho-
tographic identities undergirds her preferred sense of “grotesque,” borrowed 
from Bakhtin, in which the grotesque body is “in the act of becoming. It is 
never finished, never completed: it is continually built, created, and builds 
and creates another body.”56 Thus, ORLAN does not mock other cultures 
but rather “plays with our own prejudices and the often absurd perceptions 
that Western culture projects onto other cultures.” Her images “appear more 
sci-fi than cross-cultural.”57
ORLAN herself, quoted in O’Bryan’s chapter on Self-Hybridizations,
reports on people’s reaction to the images, just as she reported on their reac-
tions to the bumps on her forehead: “People talking about these photographs 
have a tendency to describe me as a ‘monster’ with a strange face, a distorted 
face; still these two pigeon eggs do not seem to produce the same effect when 
I am seen in reality.”58 This is the second instance of ORLAN rejecting the 
terms “monster” and “monstrous.” To use these words to describe her face as 
well as digital images of her face seems misguided at best and dismissive of 
the artist’s intentions at worst.
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Our second author, Elizabeth C. Mansfield, does not cite Frueh on 
monster/beauty but builds upon references to Freud in her 2007 book 
Too Beautiful to Picture: Zeuxis, Myth, and Mimesis. The first objection 
to Mansfield’s approach is her insistence that ORLAN’s performances and 
imagery are instances of imitation, strictly speaking. Her book is about 
Zeuxis and the copying of formal features, i.e., mimesis. The story of the 
painter Zeuxis dates back to Cicero and Pliny; he set out to paint the por-
trait of Helen of Troy only to realize that a single model would not suf-
fice. Helen’s beauty could only be realized by combining the best features 
of five different models. Mansfield touts this story as a lesson in imitation 
and in the triumph of ideal beauty over natural beauty. Much of the text 
focuses on various depictions of the legend, both artistic and literary, as well 
as the possibility of a female Zeuxis, e.g., someone like Angelica Kauffman 
(1741–1807): child prodigy, recognized portraitist by age fifteen, and the first 
female artist to depict Zeuxis selecting his models.59 The inclusion of her 
own self-portrait in the scene significantly alters the meaning of the paint-
ing and subverts the traditional discourse of the male artist depicting female 
beauty. Kauffman deliberately challenges the hitherto uncontested authority 
of the male artist, the artistic conventions of the genre, and the social norms 
of gender hierarchy. Mansfield also cites Mary Shelley, author of the 1818 
novel Frankenstein, as a challenge to the Zeuxis myth by attributing to her 
its recasting as a tale of monstrosity. Like Kauffman, Shelley assumes a crit-
ical position, taking “aim at both academic and romantic theories of cre-
ativity”; the monster’s creator, Victor Frankenstein (whom Shelley called 
“the artist” in the introduction to her 1831 revised edition of the novel), is 
a symbol—verging on a parody—of Enlightenment faith in human knowl-
edge (science) and his creation is formed with “a discriminating approach. 
. . . ‘His limbs were in proportion, and I had selected his features as beau-
tiful.’”60 Mansfield concludes, “Both Frankenstein and Zeuxis seek perfect 
form through a composite of well-chosen parts.”61
Mansfield sees ORLAN as a third in this series of pioneering women 
creatively recapturing artistic agency by undermining repressive patriarchal 
norms, and she devotes an entire chapter to her work, entitling it “Zeuxis 
in the Operating Room: ORLAN’s Carnal Art.” She sees ORLAN’s borrow-
ing from the faces of five different painted women for her Reincarnation
series as a perfect match to Zeuxis, except that she reminds us that ORLAN 
is quoting the goddesses’ stories, not strictly copying their physical features. 
But her explanation is brief and unclear, linking mimesis to DNA. More to 
the point, she offers a lengthier analysis that likens ORLAN to Mary Shelley, 
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drawing “an explicit comparison between the artist’s studio and the oper-
ating room. . . . ORLAN’s theatricalization of the operating room through 
the use of props, costumes, and recitations echoes Hollywood’s treatment of 
Frankenstein’s laboratory as a carnivalesque chamber of horrors.”62
This connection between ORLAN’s art performances and Hollywood 
horror movies relies upon the presumption that both serve to expose and dis-
guise enacted trauma by a fetishistic means, where “fetishism [according to 
Freud] is a consequence of an unresolved castration complex”; recall the 
boy witnessing his mother’s genitals (her lack of a penis) and his subsequent 
anxiety and castration complex. Freudians also assume that that anxiety can 
be assuaged by means of a fetish, usually a body part. Through the less trau-
matic, and perhaps even comforting, vehicle of the fetish, “the moment of 
originary trauma is revisited and the scene is unconsciously reenacted under 
controlled and reassuring circumstances.” Mansfield interprets ORLAN as 
an explorer of fetishism; explicit photos of her surgeries—complete with dis-
tracting designer couture worn by the physician and ORLAN’s reading of 
French philosophical texts: visual props and theatricality—serve as fetishes 
“through which her performances might be psychically reenacted or authen-
ticated” and by which we watch with horror.63 Mansfield believes that hor-
ror is the specific emotion ORLAN seeks to arouse in viewers, yet she argues 
that fetishism transforms trauma to reassuring spectacle. As in Hollywood’s 
campy versions of Frankenstein, the horror is both preserved and disguised. 
Like Kauffman and Shelley, ORLAN orchestrates the Zeuxis myth on her 
own terms, viz., those of a woman with a point of view unavailable to men.
The comparison of ORLAN to both Kauffman and Shelley seems 
forced, however. First, Kauffman repeats the Zeuxis myth in order to inject 
female agency into a genre of painting and to counter a long-standing atti-
tude that denied any identity and activity to beautiful models. By injecting 
herself into the scene, she replaces Zeuxis, taking control and coordinating 
the action. Moreover, she does not create anything like a monster, or provide 
any sort of fetishistic displacement of Freudian castration anxiety to her view-
ers. Shelley does create a monstrous literary invention, but her artistic intent 
seems quite unlike that of ORLAN, who repeatedly and undeniably states 
that she does not seek to make herself beautiful (as cosmetic surgery typically 
intends) nor to make herself monstrous (in spite of how viewers might ini-
tially see her, i.e., before they understand her artistic intent). Furthermore, if 
we invoke any standard definition of horror or the monstrous—for instance, 
that of Noël Carroll—horror (as often embodied in a monster) is the antith-
esis of beauty both visually and ethically.64 In other words, someone of 
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horror, like Frankenstein, is also morally depraved. Where does Mansfield 
see the analogy between ORLAN’s fetishistic self-portraits and the evil of 
Frankenstein and his monster creation? ORLAN’s intent to subvert, not imi-
tate, beauty ideals and her feminist agenda to create shifting, disembodied, 
hybrid identities is neither immoral nor ethically suspect. In fact, she opti-
mistically aims for multiplicity, possibility, and virtuality. As far back as 1988, 
in a series of painted posters prior to her transformative surgeries, such as one 
entitled Imaginery crédits for ORLAN before Saint ORLAN (fig. 16.5), she 
playfully parodied Bernini’s sculptural tribute to the ecstatic Saint Teresa of 
Avila, dressing up as the devotee but with breasts exposed and body on dis-
play.65 Mansfield’s harsh comparison and unfair characterization seems mis-
taken in that it denies a fair and plausible interpretation of ORLAN’s oeuvre. 
Her misunderstanding of ORLAN’s work also serves to influence the third 
author I discuss, Danielle Knafo.
Danielle Knafo’s 2009 essay “ORLAN: Monster Beauty” praises 
ORLAN for the rebelliousness of her work—its deviance, its challenge to 
the social order, and its intention to change the world—by citing Frueh’s 
concept of monster beauty and by adding her own reference to “the terri-
fying aspects of femininity . . . that simultaneously embrace and challenge 
Freud’s notions of the castrated woman.” She quotes Frueh:
Monstrousness is an unnamed and implicit feminine condition. . . . The 
Western tradition is populated by terrifically exciting female monsters, whose 
threat to men or male dominance is so great that they must be killed; Tiamat, 
the Sphinx, Medusa. Woman has been constructed as a hormonal and sex-
ual monster whose physical attractions lure man into the vagina dentata,
where he will be emasculated; whose femininity must be controlled through 
the administration of estrogen and progesterone and through dieting, the 
constriction of appetite. Female monsters in film can be monsters whose pro-
tectiveness of their spawn and whose procreative powers are both deadly to 
the human species—witness female villainy in the Alien films.
Frueh speaks of monstrousness as an implicit feminine condition that threat-
ens men and makes them fear castration, recalling Freud. But she also points 
out how these assessments of women are male fantasies, or male projec-
tions, as Knafo readily admits. Frueh’s goal is to suggest a productive way to 
build the body of (self-)love, not to create a monster to fulfill male fantasies. 
How, exactly, does Knafo argue that ORLAN actually seeks to be monstrous? 
Knafo goes on,
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Indeed, it can be said that ORLAN’s reincarnation gives birth to a type of she-
monster. She has explicitly compared her artistic aim with the creation of a 
monster; and even had herself photographed as the Bride of Frankenstein in 
1990. The difference between the two “monsters” is that she is the creator as 
well as the final product: the sacré monstre.66
Here Knafo is replicating an argument (without citation) that appears in 
Manfield’s chapter on ORLAN, where Mansfield provides pictures of 
ORLAN’s 1990 photograph Self-Portrait with a Bride of Frankenstein Wig
next to a publicity photo of actress Elsa Lanchester from the 1935 Universal 
Studios film The Bride of Frankenstein.67 At the outset, it should be noted 
that ORLAN has never compared her artistic aim with the creation of a 
monster; recall her comments specifically refuting this interpretation. Knafo 
is simply wrong on this issue.
Next, in the original comparison, Mansfield describes the filmic bride 
of Frankenstein as a being who is created (i.e., reanimated as a human being) 
“to mollify the monster’s loneliness and violent hatred of humanity.” Several 
observations come to mind. First, this hardly seems to be the stuff—evil, 
Figure 16.5. ORLAN, Painted Posters series, Imaginery crédits for 
ORLAN before Saint ORLAN, 1988. Acrylic on stretched canvas, 
painted by Publidécor, 300 × 200 cm. © ORLAN.
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horror, castration-anxiety-inducing she-monster—of which a monster, male 
or female, is made. Yet Mansfield insists that ORLAN’s imitation of the bride 
of Frankenstein is her creation of a new identity, “an unstable icon of fem-
ininity”: “At once reassuring in its mimicry of Hollywood glamour shots or 
glossy advertisements and threatening in its evocation of monstrosity, vio-
lence, and death, the figure in ‘Self-Portrait with a Bride of Frankenstein 
Wig’ vacillates between two subject positions: phallic mother and castrated 
and therefore threatening other.”68
Second, being neither monster nor mother, the bride of Frankenstein 
was intended (we presume) to be the helpmate of the male monster, the Eve 
to his Adam. To attribute monstrosity as well as “erotic potential” to her is 
to present a caricature of the bride (who is already a parodic figure herself) 
as erotically charged and alluring monster. It is doubtful that Frueh would 
agree that the bride of Frankenstein, even as a mythic creation, could pos-
sess the allure of which she speaks so highly, the self-possessed, agentic sex-
uality of beauty and self-love.
Third, ORLAN’s self-portrait as the Bride of Frankenstein was created 
in 1990, quite early in her artistic output: before Entre Deux, before The 
Reincarnation of St. ORLAN, and even before Self-Hybridizations. The 
photo of her with wig and dramatic pose is not the outgrowth of her surger-
ies and imaginative photographic plays on hybrid identity; rather, it is the 
precursor. To ascribe monstrosity to it as if it is tied to the bloody surgeries 
of her performances is to misconstrue its role within the evolution of her 
total artistic output and to inject a 1990 photo into 2009 critical discourse 
without acknowledging its date of production. Knafo goes on to briefly dis-
cuss Self-Hybridizations, and although she does not call these photographs 
monstrous (she sees them, in part, as ORLAN’s refusal “to accept her body’s 
limitations—its difference and/or lack—which place her in a state of castra-
tion”), she lumps them together with the previous examples, as if they too 
might be monstrous:
Thus, whether we gaze at Medusa’s head, the head of Frankenstein’s Bride, 
or the composite images of ORLAN’s face with those of pre-Columbian, 
African, or Native American origin, we come tête-à-tête with the artist’s 
hybrid images in an intimate yet bizarre reciprocal mirroring of her own 
devising.69
Fourth, to link the supposed horror of the photo, i.e., the fact that 
ORLAN chose to picture herself as the Bride of Frankenstein, to the horror 
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of Hollywood movies seems superficial. It leads Knafo down the path of 
ascribing horror to ORLAN herself (birthing herself as a she-monster), end-
ing with the “virtual disappearance of the female as the subject of beauty in 
the art of recent decades.” Nothing could be further from the truth; nearly 
every artwork and performance by ORLAN deals with beauty. Knafo is incor-
rect to claim ORLAN leaves it behind, just as she is wrong to attribute to 
her a preoccupation with monster beauty concurrent with her dismissal of 
real beauty. Her final assessment of ORLAN’s monstrosity reveals something 
even more important, however: “When classical traces of beauty appear in 
the works of artists like Hannah Wilke, Cindy Sherman, or ORLAN, it speaks 
as social commentary, rather than bristling with its own aesthetic energy.”70
This leads to a final criticism of all three authors, and in fact, many femi-
nist critics to date: they dismiss aesthetic concerns by attending primarily and 
solely to the nonaesthetic. Of course ORLAN, like many other artists with 
feminist intentions and effective strategies to construct critical discourse and 
viewer reactions, is explicitly concerned with social commentary. But that is 
not her only concern. Her choices of form, color, expression, medium, size, 
and technology all attest to her aesthetic decision-making priorities. It is not 
inconsequential that her photographs, whether of real or virtual beauty, are 
in themselves often both stunning and beautiful. Artistic choices are dictated 
by aesthetic concerns; to deny her that agency is to relegate the aesthetic 
import of her work to the trash heap. ORLAN expects her critics, particularly 
her supporters, to understand and appreciate the combination of both social 
commentary and artistic value.71 Viewers need to multitask! It is undeniable 
that ORLAN demands a lot of her audience, but then again, she spares us 
nothing. She gives her all.
Changes in Feminist Discourse
Perhaps, not surprisingly, there is a significant yet subtle change in 
the term “feminist” in evidence here, visible over time from 1998 to 2010. 
Tanya Augsberg, at one point in her 1998 essay, compares ORLAN’s negative 
views of her mother with those of Simone de Beauvoir, who unabashedly 
denounced the bourgeois housewife of twentieth-century France as too self-
sacrificing (for the sake of family) and obsessed with an overly clean house 
and its sterile objects within. Augsberg is not alone in seeing similarities 
between generations of women, noting how both ORLAN and Beauvoir—
in attacking idle housewives, i.e., their mothers—“can be viewed as the suc-
ceeding generation’s rebellion against its predecessors.”72 The history of 
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feminism, like that of philosophy, includes self-criticism and self-correction, 
so we should not expect this rebellion against one’s predecessors to be unnat-
ural or unwelcome. I only mention it here in order to make sense of why cer-
tain critics of ORLAN, namely Augsberg and still others too numerous to 
mention (including myself), have never attributed the descriptor “monster” 
to her work, and yet it has been applied three times (by O’Bryan, Mansfield, 
and Knafo) in only the first decade of the twenty-first century. Perhaps it is 
the psychoanalytic turn in the assessment of her work that invites the term. 
My suggestion is that a careful analysis of ORLAN’s work with a focus on her 
artistic intent shows that it does not warrant the charge of monstrousness.73
Conclusion: The Future of Virtual Beauty
Sorry, Kant and Kantians near and far, but virtual beauty is the wave of 
the future, and ORLAN is not the only one leading the charge. Elisabeth 
Azoulay and Françoise Gaillard, editors of the outsized project 100,000 Years 
of Beauty, consider the many variations of “Mona Lisa and me” in an intro-
ductory essay to the fifth and final volume of the series, Future/Projections.
Although Yasumasa Morimura’s versions are not mentioned, they could eas-
ily have been included, since his virtual self-portraits as the Mona Lisa qual-
ify as much as those they discuss, by Bani Thani, Dominic Philibert, Paul 
M. Constantin Boym/ELIKA, and an anonymous artist, all of whom hybrid-
ize the body and face to make it more diversified in its expansion to the five 
themes of the volume: cosmopoliteness, hypernarcissus, the third sex, amor-
tality, and cyber sapiens. “Each one represents a window open onto a future 
whose mysteries stir our collective imagination,” they write as they predict a 
future world that borrows from the imaginations of decades of science fiction 
writers and unlimited artistic visions.74 They base their prediction on demo-
graphics, emphasizing that by the year 2050, 70 percent of the world’s nine 
billion people will live in cities, all mixing together—majorities with cultural 
minorities—in melting pots of globalization, hybridization, new canons of 
beauty, and cosmopoliteness, where individuals will seek unique ways to dis-
tinguish themselves from others by beautifying in unimaginable ways, asking 
themselves “How many am I?” rather than “Who am I?” In light of this pro-
jection, ORLAN’s deliberate exploration of self-hybridization is revered as a 
highly personal form of beauty and technoscience. Artificial wombs, clon-
ing (of a third sex?), and the blurring of traditional age categories will lead to 
people living much longer lives, creating a new norm of elderly beauty for 
the species, a hybrid of postmortality, i.e., a form of amortality. Moreover, 
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technoscience will bring us far beyond the advances in self-invention offered 
by technologies like Photoshop, doubtless soon to be outdated.
The digital revolution has explored only a fraction of the full potential of vir-
tual reality. The virtual realm will develop into a flood of ideas, images and 
sounds beyond our control, accessible instantaneously and simultaneously 
in all four corners of the globe.75
These are lofty predictions with scary implications, particularly one’s sense 
of loss of control, given the rather unfathomable number of nine billion peo-
ple all being sustained by Planet Earth.
In an introductory essay, the philosopher Gaillard imagines persons 
of the future to be “nomads of identity,” free from the delusion of “purity” 
because we have all come from various strains of lineage and we are “the 
fruit of inter-ethnical and inter-cultural mélanges. . . . We are all hybrid chil-
dren of history.” The nomad of identity will be at home anywhere, accepted 
and encouraged, resulting in a hybrid humanity. Most importantly, we will 
have overcome the resistance to change, the new, the alien, and the hybrid: 
“Deep-rooted prejudices had to be overcome as the hybrid figure had long 
borne the brunt of archaic fears. It was seen as an anomaly of nature, a mon-
ster that menaced a group’s homogeneity by undermining its purity.”76 But 
those days are over, replaced by an open, optimistic, and welcoming view of 
the future:
The world has never before experienced such human migration through 
interposed images. From the East, South, Middle East or Far West, repre-
sentations of oneself and others are diffused, exchanged and interpenetrated, 
along with one’s cultural practices, beginning with those relating to beauty. 
An unprecedented kind of cosmopolitism is being engendered before our 
eyes, at the junction of the real and the virtual. . . . What outcome will it 
have for the people of tomorrow? Two ways take shape: the fusion and confu-
sion of aesthetic models and norms or their juxtaposition and cohabitation.77
Acknowledgment and welcome of aesthetic change will follow nomadic 
identity, and this vision of the future is replete with considerations of new 
aesthetic norms, particularly for virtual beauty. There will be an aesthetic 
of “shock” that includes collages and juxtapositions (already very much 
in vogue), hybridizations of genes, cultures, and images from all over the 
planet, and the unlikely mix of both real and virtual whereby beauty will 
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often be defined as ugliness transcended. “The dictators of beauty will be 
disorientated, as instead of leading the ball they will be the ones who have to 
follow the movements of the street’s orchestration.”78 In this unprecedented 
world, seeing ORLAN on the street will seem as ordinary as encountering 
her disembodied virtual hybrid beauty in large-scale, colorful, aesthetically 
pleasing photographs.
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